Microsoft's Long Reach
Controversy continues to swirl around the industry-leader's actions

As the Justice Department's anti-trust suit against Microsoft continues, more details emerge regarding the strong-arm tactics employed by the software industry titan. At issue is the degree to which Microsoft's Internet Explorer web browser is integrated into its Windows operating system. Microsoft claims that its browser is not an application, but a "set of technologies" that is integral to Windows. However, the claim flies in the face of common sense, and that's not just my opinion -- it's the consensus of the rest of the software industry. As government lawyers have pointed out with some justifiable glee, Microsoft's own dictionary of computer terms defines a web browser as an "application."

Whether or not Microsoft will ultimately be able to defend its assertion that a browser is not a browser, it still faces serious charges relating to its coercive treatment of industry rivals, almost all of whom are in the precarious position of having to cooperate with Microsoft due to its overwhelmingly dominant market share. Microsoft's principle target and victim is the Netscape corporation. The market share for Netscape's Navigator browser has been decimated since Microsoft began giving its Internet Explorer browser away (as a stand-alone application, believe it or not) and twisting the arms of computer manufacturers to force them to include Internet Explorer on their new machines. Netscape CEO James Barkdale testified that Microsoft built "unnecessary technical incompatibilities" into Windows that caused Netscape to freeze, and delayed providing important technical information to Netscape, even though it was the kind of information that Microsoft routinely supplies to software manufacturers for update purposes.

Netscape is not the only company to suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous business practices. The Sun corporation licensed its Java programming language to Microsoft -- naturally enough, since Windows is the prevailing PC platform. But Microsoft began distributing a modified version of Java that was incompatible with Sun's standard Java. Moreover, the modified version would only run on Windows machines. Since the No. 1 selling point for Java is that it runs on all platforms, Sun was understandably miffed. After a federal judge sided with Sun, ruling that Microsoft had violated its licensing agreement, Microsoft pledged to support the standard version of Java.

A classic example of Microsoft's acquisition tactics can be found in its dealings with RealNetworks, the company that made it possible to deliver "streaming" audio and video to the desktop. RealNetworks CEO Rob Glaser testified that Microsoft deliberately tried to "break" his multimedia software by rendering it inoperable in the Windows operating system. They finally reached an agreement that left Microsoft owning 10 percent of RealNetworks. After Glaser testified in the anti-trust suit, Microsoft sold its 10 percent and announced that it would develop streaming video software to compete with RealNetworks (though it said Glaser's testimony was not the reason for the decision, and further maintained that Glaser was lying anyway).

When Apple was in a precarious position in 1997 (which has since turned around dramatically), Microsoft threatened to simply stop writing software for the Mac and drive the company out of the multimedia business if Apple didn't agree to an unfair division of the multimedia playback software market. The result was Microsoft investing in Apple in exchange for a "non-voting" stake in the company, and the sudden appearance of Internet Explorer on every new Mac. Next month we'll look at new industry threats to Microsoft's dominance.

John F. Clark is the College Technology Coordinator for the College of Communications and Information Studies at the University of Kentucky.

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